The title assumes that the idea of the ‘secular society’ is a settled one. It is not. It also suggests an understanding of what it is to ‘act’ on religious belief. This is debatable. By arguing against ‘prevention’, it also implies the possibility of its opposite – that some may wish precisely to prevent religiously motivated actions. Why might they do so?

The secular society is increasingly criticized as a chimera. Its meaning in Britain is very different to those of France, Turkey and the USA for example, and they in turn are very different to each other. Classic secularism theory observes the decline of the significance of religions caused by four main factors: philosophical processes which made possible “the freeing of [certain] areas of life from their theological origins or basis” (Alexander 2002 p48); urbanization, which freed people from small rural communities dominated by the church; technology, especially medical technology, which challenges ideas of the natural world and our part in it as God-given; and the process of ceding to the state certain “specialised roles and institutions” (Alexander 2002 p49) such as the delivery of education, health and social care. But these ideas have been criticized. The ‘freeing’ process fails to recognize the degree to which society is steeped in the legacies of religious thinking and infused with religious ideas and people (see Brown 2006). Urbanisation and technology have been strongest in the USA where religiousness is also significantly stronger than anywhere in Europe. The ceding of specialist welfare roles was never complete and faith based welfare service provision persisted throughout the 20th Century in charities and voluntary sector agencies like the Red Cross, Oxfam, CAFOD, Save the Children, Church Urban Fund, and in a plethora of local community based projects (see Dinham 2006). In fact faith-based provision has been increasingly used by governments in the ‘mixed economy of welfare’ on both sides of the Atlantic in the last decade. In the USA there is an ‘Office of the Faith Based Initiative’ in the White House and in the UK the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government has a panel of faith advisors called the Faith Communities Consultative Council. 

In empirical terms too, (what has actually happened, according to evidence), a simple view of secularism looks unconvincing. Part of this is associated with the rather curious way in which faith is played out in public in the UK through what has been called “the dignified parts of the constitution” (Weller in Dinham et al 2008): the head of state is also head of an established church, Bishops sit in the upper house of parliament and (Christian) houses of worship are the context for public events such as royal weddings and state services of thanksgiving and remembrance. Across and beyond all the faiths, the lifespan is frequently marked in religious buildings through rites such as baptisms, weddings and funerals.

The religious make up of the UK is also extremely complicated and very diverse. In the UK, 45,162,895 people reported a religious affiliation in the 2001 census. This represents 76.8% of the total population, of which the vast majority is Christian, followed (numerically) by Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, Jews, Buddhists, Jains, Baha’i and Zoroastrians. All the ‘faiths’ data is highly debated, however, and it has been observed that “sociologists are always suspicious of statistics…even more [so] of religious statistics” (Davie 1999 p45). The main issue is that measures which might be considered at first glance unambiguous, such as ‘membership’ or ‘affiliation’, may mean very different things to different people. Thus another survey, the British Social Attitudes Survey, seems to show that 41.5% of respondents had ‘no religion’ (compared to 15.5% in the UK Census). Nevertheless, it is also notable that “relatively few British people have opted out of religion altogether: out and out atheists are rare” (Davie 1999 p2).

Another dimension is the shift that has been noted from ‘believing to belonging’ (see Davie 1999). Davie observes that “…on the one hand, variables concerned with feelings, experience and the more numinous aspects of religious belief demonstrate considerable persistence…; on the other, those which measure religious orthodoxy, ritual participation and institutional attachment display an undeniable degree of secularization…” (Davie 1999 pp4-5)

Therefore, though it has been observed that “Statistically there can be little doubt about the trends; they go downwards” (Davie 1999 p52), some sociologists have been eating their words. For example, Peter Berger has replaced his earlier assertion that by “the twenty first century, religious believers are likely to be found only in small sects, huddled together to resist a worldwide secular culture” (Berger 1968), with a more recent observation that “the world today, with some exceptions…is as furiously religious as it ever was…” (Berger 1999).

So what of ‘acting’ on all this religious belief (or lack of it)? There seem to be at least three kinds of faith based action in society. The first is social and community action in local neighbourhoods. A recent review in England shows high levels of this sort of acting, the majority of which is described as ‘youth work’ in neighbourhood projects (Dinham 2006). It also involves significant amounts of welfare work such as hospital car schemes, work with children and families and care of the elderly. ‘Secular’ critics are concerned that such actions might come with strings attached, and be used as opportunities for evangelizing or conversion. What limited evidence there is suggests that this is rarely the case, and most of this activity is governed by charity law which prohibits proselytisation.

A second set of ‘actions’ is to do with social capital and community cohesion. These are terms favoured by government, though they originate in the social sciences. Faith groups are understood to be ‘good at community’ – they have buildings, staff, volunteers, resources, and long histories in almost every part of the country, even where other agencies have given up and withdrawn, for example in some inner city areas. This kind of action tends to be biased towards Christianity which has most resources, organisation and capacity. Faiths which are newer to Britain are active in this kind of work but are able to do less of it. ‘Secular’ critics point out that some are so good at ‘bonding’ in their communities that they forget to ‘bridge’ and ‘link’ to wider society and act inwardly and in self-interest rather than for the wider community.

A third set of actions is to do with ‘active citizenship’. This involves activities like taking part in neighbourhood planning panels, police and health boards, or being a school governor. The Citizenship Survey (Home Office 2005) indicates that people in faith communities are slightly better at this, numerically, than others, though the data is debated. ‘Secular’ critics are concerned that this sort of activity ‘privileges’ religious faith over other forms of interest or identity, giving them undue voice and influence in public policy.

Another way in which religious belief is sometimes enacted in society is usually described as ‘violent extremism’ and ‘radicalism’ such as 9/11 and 7/7. These are probably reasons for a considerable degree of anxiety about religion in British society. Samuel Huntington has suggested that it reflects a ‘clash of civilisations’ between Islam and the West, though research suggests that extremist ideas are as rare amongst Muslims in Britain as they are amongst other religious groups. Nevertheless, a rhetoric of extremism has developed in the government’s ‘Prevention of Violent Extremism’ policies which leads to an ‘othering’ of Muslims, akin to the ‘othering’ of Jews and Catholics in European history. It also explains a desire to set society neutrally ‘above the fray’ of religious debate. This is misplaced because the religious contribution – and threat – will not go away by simply ignoring them. They must be acknowledged, put in their context and worked through. Secularism itself is highly value-laden and far from neutral. As one stance among many it must join the debate rather than attempt to sit above it. Therefore, there is no such thing as a secular society and attempts to prevent people acting on their religious beliefs misunderstand this. Their mistake becomes, in turn, the basis upon which the many positive contributions made by people of faith can be missed, and this is a waste to the detriment of all. Religious people should not be prevented from acting on their beliefs. They should be encouraged to continue to do so.

Dr Adam Dinham, Reader in Religion and Society, holds degrees in Theology and Religious Studies (BA & MA, Cambridge), Social Studies (MA, Brunel) and Politics and Community Development (PhD, Goldsmiths, University of London). He is qualified as a social worker and has practiced in Social Work and Community Development in city contexts, with an interest in working with faith communities in areas of urban disadvantage. He is policy advisor to a number of faith-based agencies and policy bodies, including the Faith Based Regeneration Network and the CoExistence Trust in the House of Lords, and has advised central government on issues of public faith. He is Peace Studies Fellow at the University of Calgary, Director of the Faiths and Civil Society Network of the Association of Commonwealth Universities and has published widely on faith in the public realm. He is currently Programme Director for the ‘Religious Literacy Leadership in Higher Education’ programme.